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Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy 
Michael Kang†
Not long ago, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor declared dis-




The new attacks on disclosure are explained by recent po-
litical and technological developments in campaign finance. On 
the political side, the sudden transformation of campaign fi-
nance law after Citizens United re-set the stakes for campaign 
finance reform by stripping away so much of longstanding 
campaign finance regulation, leaving disclosure laws as one of 
the most prominent regulatory elements still in place. Oppo-
nents of regulation once in favor of “deregulate and disclose” no 
longer feel compelled to settle for disclosure now that the “de-
regulate” component of their former approach has already tak-
en place.
 but campaign disclosure laws now are under legal and 
political attack as never before. In several prominent cases, 
plaintiffs challenged campaign disclosure laws in direct democ-
racy, alleging a likelihood of harassment as a result of com-
pelled disclosure in today’s Internet age. Although the legal 
challenges so far have been unsuccessful, the Supreme Court 
has invited further challenges along the same lines on an as-
applied basis. What is more, legal scholars who once universal-
ly agreed on disclosure’s value now call increasingly for scaling 
back compelled campaign disclosure. Campaign disclosure thus 
has emerged as a new front in election law, with direct democ-
racy as the main battleground.  
2
 
†  Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law. Many thanks to 
Beth Garrett and Bill McGeveran for their helpful comments on previous 
drafts. Copyright © 2013 by Michael Kang. 
 On the technological side, the Internet dramatically 
 1. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 223 
(1999) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976)).  
 2. See infra text accompanying note 14 (describing the “deregulate and 
disclose” approach).  
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decreased the costs of acquiring disclosed information, which is 
now at the touch of a finger away from anyone with web access. 
The lower cost of information has made it simpler to pursue po-
litical opponents identified by their disclosed activity, particu-
larly within the contentious single-issue politics of direct de-
mocracy.  
In this Article, I argue that recalibration of campaign dis-
closure laws in direct democracy may well be advisable in light 
of these developments but are best addressed legislatively, not 
judicially. Legislatures are better positioned than courts to cal-
ibrate the extraction of useful information of voters against 
competing interests in privacy and potential harassment based 
on that compelled disclosure. Disclosure laws serve as an im-
portant source of voter information about the political merits of 
ballot measures by revealing their most intense and well-
known supporters and opponents. In direct democracy, such in-
formation is particularly helpful to voters in figuring out how to 
vote because the familiar voting cues upon which they rely in 
candidate elections, such as party identification and an incum-
bent’s past performance, are not as salient or simply unavaila-
ble.  
What is more, broader privacy worries about campaign dis-
closure are, even in the Internet age, fairly limited as best we 
can tell so far.3
I.  THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF CAMPAIGN 
DISCLOSURE LAWS   
 The low-grade chilling and harassment alleged 
in recent challenges to campaign disclosure laws in direct de-
mocracy are the type of generalized worry that any citizen is 
susceptible to suffer and amenable to redress through the polit-
ical process. With the changing dynamics of campaign disclo-
sure in the Internet age, courts should let legislatures do their 
jobs in adapting the law appropriately to a problem that they 
have proper incentives to monitor. 
Disclosure is the most popular and least controversial form 
of campaign regulation.4
 
 3. Here I address the privacy costs of campaign disclosure to individuals, 
as plaintiffs and commentators have presented them. I do not address, for ex-
ample, compliance costs of disclosure laws for political committees and candi-
dates that may raise concerns outside the scope of this Article.  
 Disclosure of campaign finance infor-
 4. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELEC-
TION L.J. 273, 273 (2010) (“[D]isclosure is probably the most successful ele-
ment of our campaign finance system.”); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational 
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mation dates back longer than a century in state and federal 
law and is routinely required not only in the United States, but 
across democracies around the world. It owes its popularity to 
both its relative non-intrusiveness and its perceived power to 
deter corruption. As Justice Brandeis once famously wrote, 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.”5
Campaign finance disclosure is thus a basic and familiar 
component of every system of campaign finance regulation. 
Federal law requires disclosure of contributions above $200, in-
cluding the name, address, business, and occupation of the con-
tributor, as well as disclosure of expenditures above $200 per 
election cycle.
 Disclosure, by shining a light on 
politics, is assumed to deter corruption without interfering ma-
terially with free expression.  
6
The Court long ago announced in Buckley v. Valeo that dis-
closure requirements of campaign contributions and expendi-
tures were justified constitutionally by the government’s inter-
est in informing voters.
 State law disclosure requirements vary, but vir-
tually every state requires a level of reporting of contributions 
to candidates and almost all states require reporting of expend-
itures above some threshold amount. What is more, state regu-
lation of direct democracy, while less extensive than regulation 
of candidate elections, typically requires disclosure of campaign 
finance expenditures expressly advocating in support of or op-
position to a particular ballot measure above a specified 
threshold.  
7 This government interest in informing 
voters constituted a separate government interest from the in-
terest in preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, as 
well as from the interest in facilitating enforcement of cam-
paign finance restrictions. Disclosure, the Court reasoned, 
“provides the electorate with information as to where political 
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candi-
date in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek 
federal office.”8
 
Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 664 (2012) (“For most of the post-Buckley history 
of campaign finance regulation, reformers and deregulationists alike viewed 
disclosure as an uncontroversial regulatory technique.”). 
 By exposing sources of support and opposition, 
 5. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 
1913, at 10, 10 (describing the value of disclosure in the context of investment 
banking regulation). 
 6. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006). 
 7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 8. Id. at 66–67 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-564, at 4 (1971)) (internal quo-
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campaign finance disclosure helped voters understand more 
precisely where candidates stood on the political spectrum and 
alerted voters to the interests to which candidates were most 
likely to be responsive.  
Disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures in 
support or opposition of a candidate may reveal more meaning-
ful information than the candidate would otherwise want to re-
veal. Candidates and their proxies, at least in first-past-the-
post elections, have incentives to obscure their positions to a 
degree in pursuit of the median voter. They seek not to alienate 
too many voters by being unnecessarily specific about their po-
sitions and therefore gain from a measure of ambiguity.9
Disclosure serves this interest in informing voters at what 
the Court considered little cost to political expression.
 How-
ever, even when candidates and their proxies are thus predict-
ably ambiguous, voters may find more guidance about their 
sincere positions by looking instead to campaign finance disclo-
sures. Disclosed contributions and expenditures represent more 
than the cheap talk of campaign rhetoric and require the real 
investment of money. Only sincere supporters would invest 
significant amounts of money in a candidate’s campaign, and 
only sincere opponents would invest significant money against 
a candidate, such that their identities can provide trustworthy 
cues about the candidate’s substance.  
10 Other 
forms of campaign finance regulation, such as contribution lim-
its and source restrictions, impose hard prohibitions on the use 
of money for campaign speech.11 They cut off the amount of 
speech and present courts with difficult, contested tradeoffs be-
tween the value of the prohibited speech and the countervailing 
government interests. By contrast, disclosure laws simply re-
quire public notification but otherwise do not directly restrict 
the breadth or depth of campaign finance activity.12
 
tation marks omitted). 
 For this 
 9. See generally Benjamin I. Page, The Theory of Political Ambiguity, 70 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 742 (1976); Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: 
Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555 (1972). 
 10. See Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64–68 (deeming disclosure in most applications 
as the least restrictive means of addressing campaign ignorance and corrup-
tion). 
 11. See id. at 64 (“[D]isclosure requirements impose no ceiling on cam-
paign-related activities.”).  
 12. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (“[D]isclosure 
requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on 
campaign-related activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’” 
(quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003); Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64)).  
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reason, disclosure laws may deter campaign finance activity, 
and any attendant risk of corruption, by exposing it and scaring 
away those who worry about public suspicion that may result. 
However, candidates and supporters whose financial relation-
ships do not raise public suspicion about corruption or undue 
influence have less reason to curb their campaign finance activ-
ity and probably will not. Disclosure is less intrusive than di-
rect limits because it “places the question of undue influence or 
preferential access in the hands of the voters, who, aided by the 
institutional press, can follow the money and hold representa-
tives accountable for any trails they don’t like.”13
For these reasons, many opponents of campaign finance re-
form advocated for disclosure as a substitute for other forms of 
campaign finance regulation. Richard Briffault describes an 
approach among a group of commentators and political actors 
that he calls “deregulate and disclose.”
 
14 This group long urged 
a repeal of direct campaign finance restrictions in favor of reli-
ance on public disclosure alone. The Citizen Legislature and 
Political Freedom Act embodied the approach,15 introduced by 
Republican congressmen John Doolittle and Tom DeLay with 
academic support from former FEC commissioner Bradley 
Smith, among others.16 As Smith put it, “disclosure of contribu-
tions and expenditures is one part of the law on which virtually 
all observers agree.”17
However, disclosure laws recently have begun to face sig-
nificant criticism for the first time, after the rest of campaign 
finance law was so radically destabilized by Citizens United v. 
FEC.
 Under this view, though, disclosure was 




 13. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH 
L. REV. 311, 326.  
 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional federal prohibitions on corporate electioneer-
 14. Briffault, supra note 4, at 286–90; see also David Schultz, Disclosure is 
Not Enough: Empirical Lessons from State Experiences, 4 ELECTION L.J. 349 
(2005) (identifying the same group and arguing against its empirical premis-
es).  
 15. H.R. 965, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 16. See BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 82 (2001); see also LARRY J. 
SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF 
CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 328–35 (1996); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 
326.  
 17. Bradley A. Smith, A Moderate, Modern Campaign Finance Reform 
Agenda, 12 NEXUS 3, 15 (2007).  
 18. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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ing and in the process began a chain of legal developments that 
rapidly de-regulated campaign finance in a matter of months.19 
Citizens United narrowed its definition of quid pro quo corrup-
tion, squeezing away the constitutional grounds for many 
longstanding forms of campaign finance regulation.20 By declar-
ing unequivocally that independent expenditures presented no 
risk of quid pro quo corruption under any circumstances as a 
matter of law, Citizens United sent a powerful signal to lower 
courts, as well as the FEC.21
Citizens United, however, said little about disclosure other 
than to reiterate and affirm longstanding understandings 
about disclosure’s value. In fact, eight of nine justices in Citi-
zens United itself upheld applicable disclosure requirements on 
corporate electioneering even as the Court struck down limits 
on that spending.
 By the next federal elections in the 
fall of 2010, the FEC had rapidly de-regulated much of the 
campaign finance regulatory apparatus that had stood in place 
at least since the 1974 comprehensive revisions of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act. As a result, only candidates, parties, 
and groups that contribute to candidates and parties remained 
comprehensively regulated by federal contribution limits, while 
most other non-connected groups were regulated mainly, if at 
all, through disclosure requirements.  
22 The majority opinion explained that “trans-
parency [provided by disclosure] enables the electorate to make 
informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers 
and messages.”23 As a result, even when the Court found no ap-
plicable government interest in the prevention of corruption 
that could justify the federal regulations on corporate election-
eering in Citizens United, the Court upheld associated disclo-
sure requirements on the basis of this separate interest in in-
forming voters firmly rooted since Buckley v. Valeo in campaign 
finance law.24
Against this background, disclosure nonetheless became a 
new contested front in campaign finance law because it sur-
vived largely unchanged from the post-Citizens United trans-
formation of campaign finance law. It survived intact after Cit-
 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. See Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super-PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 22. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914–16. 
 23. Id. at 916.  
 24. See Ortiz, supra note 4, at 674–75. 
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izens United, while much of the rest of campaign finance regu-
lation was declared unconstitutional or at least constitutionally 
suspect.25 As a result, the timing of any new offensive against 
disclosure was to an important degree strategic, targeting what 
regulation remained intact after Citizens United, rather than 
responding to substantial change to the constitutional law re-
garding disclosure. Past support for “deregulate and disclose,” 
which had now arrived in important respects, does not seem to 
diminish today’s criticism of disclosure.26 Past supporters of de-
regulate and disclose, such as Senator Mitch McConnell, be-
came newly vocal opponents of disclosure only after Citizens 
United helped wipe away much of the longstanding regulation 
that previously had been their focus.27
II.  NEW WORRIES ABOUT HARRASMENT FROM 
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE: THE MARRIAGE OF DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY   
  
In fairness, technological advances have changed the soci-
opolitical impact of disclosure laws, particularly so during the 
past decade. The ready availability of disclosed campaign fi-
nance information on the Internet now spreads that infor-
mation more rapidly and widely throughout the mass public 
than ever before. Campaign finance disclosures that once re-
quired great labor to obtain from the state in written format, 
and therefore almost always filtered through the news media in 
piecemeal fashion, now are seconds away from the fingertips of 
anyone with Internet access. This democratization of access al-
so potentially democratizes the propensity for harassment 
based on disclosure. Contributors to unpopular causes or can-
didates now could be investigated at low cost, revealed, and po-
tentially harassed by those with divergent views for their cam-
paign finance activity. What is more, the sophistication of the 
major parties and other political actors in analyzing campaign 
 
 25. See generally Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing the ramifications of Citizens United). 
 26. See Thomas E. Mann, Commentary, Campaign Finance in the Wake of 
Citizens United, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 583, 590 (2011) (“Now effective dis-
closure is opposed by the same people who once championed it.”).  
 27. See, e.g., Fred Hiatt, A GOP Bait-and-switch on Disclosure, WASH. 
POST, June 18, 2012, at A15; see also Disclosure Vote Leaves Trail of Broken 
Republican Vows, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2012-07-17/disclose-vote-leaves-trail-of-broken-republican-vows 
.html (reporting the shift of the Republican Party on campaign finance disclo-
sure since Citizens United).  
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finance data, along with a rich stew of other individual-level 
data, has made disclosure of campaign finance activity a part of 
a larger concern about personal privacy in the context of cam-
paign mobilization.28
An expanded risk of harassment is the core premise of new 
academic criticism of campaign finance disclosure laws. Wil-
liam McGeveran argues that “Internet disclosure on a massive 
scale changes everything.”
 
29 During an earlier age, only the 
biggest or most well-known spenders might find their political 
advocacy revealed for public consumption, but with the Inter-
net, average people find their low-level donations reported in 
highly trafficked websites such as the Huffington Post. This 
shift in the scale of publicity given to campaign finance disclo-
sures, in the minds of critics, dramatically increases the priva-
cy costs of disclosure for low-level spenders. What is more, the 
informational benefits from disclosure of such low-level spend-
ers is quite minimal.30
Constitutional concerns about the privacy of low-level do-
nors have played out most prominently in the context of direct 
democracy. Proposition 8, presented directly to the California 
state electorate as a ballot measure in 2008, proposed to amend 
the state constitution to provide that “[o]nly marriage between 
a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”
 If the financial commitment of large-
level campaign spending makes credibly clear the campaign’s 
association with the spender’s interests, then the same salient 
inference of association is largely absent for low-level spending 
by politically unknown sources. 
31
 
 28. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The 
Emerging Challenge for Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1070, 
1075–84 (2005) (discussing sophisticated use of data analysis and individual 
tailoring of partisan messaging); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Check-
book: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1, 18–20 (2003) (describing data mining of campaign finance data). See gener-
ally SASHA ISSENBERG, THE VICTORY LAB: THE SECRET SCIENCE OF WINNING 
CAMPAIGNS (2012) (describing the use of social science analysis to discriminate 
among voters for purposes of tailoring political appeals). 
 After 
Proposition 8’s passage in 2008, opponents of the measure used 
 29. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theo-
ry to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 863 (2011). 
 30. See Briffault, supra note 4, at 300 (“Knowing the names and addresses 
of large numbers of individual small donors is unlikely to be helpful to the 
public or the many intermediaries . . . who evaluate campaign finance infor-
mation.”).  
 31. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, TEXT OF PROPOSED 
LAWS, PROPOSITION 8 (2008), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/ 
general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop8. 
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the state Internet database of campaign finance data to identify 
individuals who had donated money in support of Proposition 8 
and then set up websites that listed their personal information, 
including addresses and phone numbers.32 Several such sup-
porters claimed subsequent harassment, alleging among other 
things, retaliatory boycotting of their businesses, threats of vio-
lence, job loss, and nasty emails and phone calls at home and 
work.33 They sued in ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen for injunc-
tive relief, arguing that they had demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that disclosure would result in threats, harassment, 
and reprisals to qualify for the as-applied exemption from com-
pelled disclosure,34 defined in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son35 and Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Commit-
tee.36 The district court, however, found that the alleged 
harassment in the case amounted to “[o]nly random acts of vio-
lence directed at a very small segment of the supporters,” dif-
ferent not in degree but in kind from the pervasive, well-
documented harassment, past and present, from both private 
and government sources, alleged by the NAACP in Jim Crow 
Alabama and the Socialist Workers Party in Ohio and beyond.37
Even so, the Supreme Court appeared to give credence to 
the allegations of harassment by Proposition 8 supporters in a 
related case, Hollingsworth v. Perry.
 
38 The Court stayed the live 
broadcast of the federal trial of Proposition 8’s constitutionality 
and cited a worry that witness testimony would be chilled.39 The 
Court explained that witness apprehension about public broad-
casting of their testimony was substantiated by incidents of 
past harassment in connection with Proposition 8, which the 
Court described prominently in introducing the case’s back-
ground.40
 
 32. David Lourie, Note, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 
8 Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 133–35 (2009). 
 The Court mentioned a New York Times article re-
porting death threats to Proposition 8 supporters and “Internet 
blacklists of pro-Proposition 8 businesses,” as well as instances 
 33. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200–04 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009).  
 34. Id. at 1205. 
 35. 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958).  
 36. 459 U.S. 87, 91–98 (1982).  
 37. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1216–17. 
 38. 130 S. Ct. 705, 713 (2010) (per curiam) (granting a stay of a broadcast 
of a federal trial partly for fear that witnesses would suffer harassment). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 707–13. 
  
2013] CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE 1709 
 
of vandalism and violence.41 Roughly the same evidence was de-
tailed by Justice Thomas in his dissent on disclosure in Citizens 
United, only in greater detail. As the lone dissenter on disclo-
sure in the case, Justice Thomas cited the evidence as warning 
of a “cottage industry that uses forcibly disclosed donor infor-
mation to pre-empt citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment 
rights.”42 He argued that examples of harassment from the 
Proposition 8 cases, as well as other harassment of conserva-
tives cited in his dissent, “sufficiently demonstrate why this 
Court should invalidate mandatory disclosure and reporting 
requirements.”43
Despite these attacks on mandatory disclosure, the Court 
so far has re-affirmed the constitutionality of disclosure laws, 
even as it dismantles much of the rest of campaign finance law. 
In yet another case involving a ballot measure dealing with 
same-sex marriage, the Court rejected a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of election-related disclosure and reporting in Doe v. 
Reed.
  
44 The 2010 case involved ballot measure R-71 in Wash-
ington that proposed the effective repeal, through direct democ-
racy, of a law that previously expanded the rights of domestic 
partners.45 Washington, like most states, requires public disclo-
sure of signatories on petitions to place a ballot measure on the 
ballot.46 At least two groups requested a list of signatories in 
support of R-71 and announced their intention to post the list 
online in searchable format.47 R-71 supporters sought a prelim-
inary injunction, claiming that the combination of disclosure 
requirements and the Internet provided “what will effectively 
become a blueprint for harassment and intimidation.”48 The 
Court, on appeal, rejected the plaintiffs’ facial challenge. The 
Court found that the plaintiffs offered “scant evidence” of per-
suasive burdens on R-71 petition signers that would trigger ju-
dicial concerns along the lines of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson.49
 
 41. Id. at 707. 
 The Court concluded that “there is no reason to as-
 42. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 981 (2010) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
 43. Id.  
 44. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010). 
 45. Id. at 2816. 
 46. See Washington Public Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) 
(2006). 
 47. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816. 
 48. Id. at 2820. 
 49. Id. at 2821. 
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sume that any burdens imposed by disclosure of typical refer-
endum petitions would be remotely like the burdens plaintiffs 
fear.”50
The Court’s fractured decision in Doe v. Reed belies the 
Court’s united front in turning away the facial constitutional 
challenge. Although the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ facial 
challenge, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion expressly 
left open the opportunity for further challenges to disclosure on 
an as-applied basis, a familiar procedural posture for the Rob-
erts Court in striking down other instances of government reg-
ulation of the political process.
 
51 Several Justices, including 
Justices Stevens and Scalia, argued in concurrence that this 
was an easy case and dismissed the burdens of disclosure, even 
in the Internet age.52 But Justice Thomas, as always on the is-
sue, dissented again that compelled disclosure chills citizen 
participation and should be held per se unconstitutional, with-
out any individual showing of special burden.53 What is more, 
Justice Alito concurred with the majority but noted that “courts 
should be generous in granting as-applied relief in this con-
text.”54 Justice Alito observed that the potential for harassment 
was “vast” and cited the previous examples from Proposition 8 
as evidence of “strong support for an as-applied exemption in 
the present case,” even though he did not support the plaintiffs’ 
broader facial challenge.55
Direct democracy has thus emerged as the venue for cur-
rent constitutional challenges over campaign disclosure’s con-
stitutionality. Direct democracy presents the risk of harass-
ment perhaps with greater focus than candidate elections 
because it presents issues individually in isolation for votes, 




 50. Id.  
 A 
person’s view on gay marriage, for instance, is easy to infer 
from her contributions to campaigning for Proposition 8, 
 51. See Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: 
The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the 
Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644–
46 (2009) (discussing the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied challenges 
in the election law context).  
 52. See Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2829 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2832 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 2824 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 2822–23. 
 56. See Lourie, supra note 32, at 154. 
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whereas her view on gay marriage, or any other specific issue, 
is not at all clear from her contributions to a major party or to 
all but the most unusual candidate.57 The major parties and 
most candidates bundle issues together into a package that 
make inferences about their supporters view necessarily non-
specific. People with opposing views therefore learn more pre-
cise information about their fellow citizens from campaign dis-
closures about ballot measures and can more precisely target 
their putative enemies for harassment if they seek to do so.58
Not only does direct democracy disaggregate issues for in-
dividual decision, it also features some of the most politically 
controversial and morally contentious issues in American poli-
tics. People on both sides of ballot measures dealing with issues 
such as abortion, affirmative action, and gay rights may identi-
fy themselves morally with their causes that perhaps increase 
the emotional stakes of these campaigns, along with the im-
pulse to harass their opponents. It is no surprise that any har-
assment over Proposition 8 arose over the issue of gay marriage 
rather than a routine ballot measure over a regulatory matter 
more typical of direct democracy in California. Indeed, the 
Court in Reed noted prominently in turning away the facial 
challenge there that the “typical referendum petitions ‘concern 
tax policy, revenue, budget, or other state law issues’” that do 
not generally raise the risk of harassment from either side.
 
Single-issue politics clearly exposes contributors’ views on a 
particular narrow question, which can be nonetheless im-
portant and controversial, when unbundled from the many is-
sues in play at once in candidate elections.  
59
 
 57. See id. at 152 (“It is nearly impossible to imagine a scenario where a 
donor could justify [a disclosure] exemption when they donate to the two major 
parties because many people donate to those parties and do so for a variety of 
reasons.”). 
 
However, ballot measures on more controversial valence issues 
occur with enough regularity, where the perceived risk of har-
assment is higher, that the constitutional challenges to disclo-
sure likely will recur and continue to be at their most salient in 
direct democracy.  
 58. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980–81 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the target-
ing of Proposition 8 supporters). 
 59. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2821 (majority opinion) (quoting Brief for Respond-
ent Washington Families Standing Together at 36, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 
2811 (2010) (No. 09-559)).  
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III.  THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAMPAIGN 
DISCLOSURE AND VOTER COMPETENCE IN DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY   
The irony is that campaign disclosure in direct democracy 
is more valuable to voter competence than in candidate elec-
tions for the same reason that the perceived risk of harass-
ment, and therefore the vulnerability to constitutional chal-
lenge, is more salient. Indeed, the same defining characteristic 
of direct democracy makes the perceived risk of harassment 
greater for ballot measures but also explains why voters need 
campaign disclosure in direct democracy far more so than in 
candidate elections. This defining characteristic, of course, is 
the absence of intermediation in direct democracy by candi-
dates and parties.  
The Progressive Era insight of direct democracy was to 
mitigate the agency costs of representative democracy by by-
passing elected representatives altogether for a determined set 
of policy questions. Direct democracy puts decision-making on a 
discrete policy question directly into the hands of the elec-
torate, without the representative filter of elected officials. As a 
result, the usual concerns about quid pro quo corruption asso-
ciated with campaign finance are inapplicable in direct democ-
racy.60
For this reason, the principal government interest in regu-
lating campaign finance—the prevention of quid pro quo cor-
ruption and the appearance thereof—does not apply in direct 
democracy as a matter of law. The Court explained that “[t]he 
risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elec-
tions . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public is-
sue.”
 There is quite literally no candidate to corrupt in the 
usual sense of quid pro quo exchange. At least on a given policy 
question, the representative process is bypassed, and the public 
decides for itself. 
61 Given that most campaign finance regulation is based on 
the government interest in prevention of corruption,62
 
 60. See Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy 
in the American States, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS 1, 2 (Shaun Bowler et al. 
eds., 1998) (“[Direct democracy] provide[s] an end-run around partisan legisla-
tures, mitigating the corrupting influences thought to operate within them.”). 
 the 
grounds for campaign finance regulation in direct democracy is 
far more limited than in candidate elections. For instance, the 
 61. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 62. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976). 
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Court has held that limits on contributions to support cam-
paigning on ballot measures are unconstitutional, even though 
limits on contributions to candidates are almost always up-
held.63 Similarly, based on the narrower ground for regulation 
of direct democracy, the Court long ago struck down prohibi-
tions on corporate electioneering on ballot measures,64 while 
upholding analogous prohibitions on corporate electioneering in 
candidate elections until only recently.65
Campaign finance disclosure in direct democracy, however, 
has always enjoyed strong constitutional support from courts 
under a separate government interest in voter competence. As 
described earlier, the Court continues to recognize a govern-
ment interest in informing voters that undergirds the constitu-
tionality of compelled campaign finance disclosure.
  
66 Just as in 
candidate elections, the Court has found in direct democracy 
too that “[i]dentification of the source of advertising may be re-
quired as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able 
to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.”67 
This interest in voter information supports campaign finance 
disclosure in candidate elections, working in connection with 
the government interest in preventing corruption applicable 
there. But in direct democracy where the anticorruption inter-
est does not apply, the Court has nonetheless upheld campaign 
finance disclosure requirements for ballot measure campaign-
ing based solely on the interest of voter competence.68
This interest in voter competence is particularly salient in 
direct democracy, much more so than in candidate elections. In 
the absence of candidates and parties to simplify and bundle 
issues for voters, voters need to know more to vote competently 





 63. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of 
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981).  
 Candidates and parties work hard to build a brand rep-
 64. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795. 
 65. Compare Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 
(1990) (upholding a state campaign finance act), with Citizens United v. FEC, 
130 S. Ct. 876, 912–13 (2010) (striking down a federal campaign finance re-
striction).  
 66. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 67. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.32. 
 68. See Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 n.23 
(9th Cir. 2003) (“Only the informational interest applies in the ballot-measure 
context . . . .”); Briffault, supra note 4, at 281 (“Indeed, voter information pro-
vides the real foundation for today’s disclosure requirements.”).  
 69. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Vot-
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utation that simplifies politics for voters and gives voters the 
ability to vote confidently for their interests without knowing 
many specifics about politics and public policy.70 Although vot-
ers are famously ignorant about basic information in politics, 
voters nonetheless learn much of what they need to know to 
navigate their vote choices over candidates and parties by re-
ferring to simple heuristics that boil down a lot of information 
into crude but useful voting cues.71 Those cues are crucial for 
voting in candidate election but largely absent in direct democ-
racy.72
The most important voting cue missing in direct democracy 
is party identification. Party identification in candidate elec-
tions enables the average voter to vote confidently and compe-
tently without a great deal of information. Party identification 




However, ballot measures, not partisan candidates, are 
presented for public vote in direct democracy. Ballot measures 
are presented on the ballot without partisan endorsement or 
affiliation, typically accompanied by only their titles and a brief 
description of their substance. Voters therefore have no simple 
voting cue associated with individual ballot measures and in-
stead must independently assess their substance to guide vot-
ing decisions. What is more, other familiar heuristics that regu-
larly inform voting on candidates, such as likeability and 
previous performance as an incumbent, are basically unavaila-
ble for ballot measures as well.
 The average voter need not know a 
great deal about individual candidates or their position, provid-
ed that he knows the candidates’ party identification and his 
own orientation toward their party. Party identification sum-
marizes enough about individual candidates such that the av-
erage voter can infer whether or not to vote for them.  
74
 
er Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus”, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1141, 1151 (2003). 
 As a result, voters are often 
 70. Id. at 1149–51. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally id. (framing the problem of voter ignorance in direct de-
mocracy as flowing from the absence of familiar voting cues from candidate 
elections).  
 73. JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION 
OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 166 (1995). 
 74. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN 
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981) (describing retrospective voting based 
on candidates’ past performance in office); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASON-
ING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 
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forced make more difficult judgments based directly on ballot 
measures’ policy substance that require greater background in-
formation than voters typically possess.  
If candidates and parties regularly took visible positions on 
ballot measures, then voters might be able to infer their voting 
preference on ballot measures from those cues from partisan 
elites. In fact, empirical studies find that voters are responsive 
to elite position-taking on ballot measures and refer to en-
dorsements for their voting decisions much in the same way 
that they do for party identification of candidates.75 When a 
public official publicly supports or opposes a ballot measure, 
voters can estimate their preference about the ballot measure 
without a great deal more information simply by siding with 
the public officials they support and opposing the position of 
public officials they oppose. For this reason, some commenta-
tors have proposed means for inserting such elite endorsements 
onto the ballot as a voting cue for ballot measures.76
The problem, though, in direct democracy is that candi-
dates and parties do not have compelling incentives to involve 
themselves consistently in ballot measure campaigning. Parties 
and candidates are in the business of winning and holding of-
fice, and unlike in candidate elections, no offices are directly at 
stake in direct democracy. Of course, parties and candidates al-
so seek to influence policy outcomes, which are affected by di-
rect democracy. But parties and candidates care only a limited 
amount about most ballot measures relative to the costs of visi-
ble campaign involvement. Candidates and parties prefer in the 
usual case to save their material and reputational capital for 
candidate elections and therefore generally avoid visible in-
volvement unless they can enhance their public standing by 
taking a side. This standing calculus has meant that candi-
dates and parties tend not to campaign very visibly for or 
  
 
97 (1994) (describing a range of candidate-based voting heuristics).  
 75. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initi-
ative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 149, 157 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998); David M. Paul & 
Clyde Brown, The Dynamics of Elite Endorsements in Professional Sports Fa-
cility Referendums, 6 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 272, 282–83 (2006); Lee Sigelman, 
Voting in Gubernatorial Succession Referenda: The Incumbency Cue, 51 J. 
POL. 869, 876 (1989).  
 76. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: 
Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming).  
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against most ballot measures in a way that voters can easily 
identify and adopt as a voting cue for themselves.  
Campaign finance disclosure helps to fill some of this in-
formational gap in direct democracy. Voters can reasonably in-
fer that the biggest spenders on campaigning for or against a 
particular ballot measure are likely to have strong preferences 
about the policy substance of the ballot measure. By identifying 
those biggest spenders, voters obtain crude but generally help-
ful information about a ballot measure and can position them-
selves in relation to their feelings about those spenders.77 As 
the Ninth Circuit put it, “[A]t least by knowing who backs or 
opposes a given initiative, voters will have a pretty good idea of 
who stands to benefit from the legislation.”78
The seminal study most clearly demonstrating the useful-
ness of campaign finance information as a voting cue is Arthur 
Lupia’s study of voter behavior on a confusing series of Califor-
nia ballot measures dealing with tort reform.
 Just as the aver-
age voter can decide how to vote in a candidate race based on 
which party has nominated the respective candidates, the av-
erage voter can decide to vote on a ballot measure based largely 
on what interest group has contributed most, and therefore has 
effectively announced a preference, on the competing sides of 
the campaign over that ballot measure.  
79 Lupia quizzed 
voters about their knowledge about the policy substance of five 
tort reform measures on the ballot at the time, as well as 
whether they knew the positions of the insurance industry, tri-
al lawyers, and Ralph Nader on each proposition.80 Lupia found 
that voters who knew only the positions of the interest groups, 
but were ignorant about the ballot measures’ substance, were 
able to vote identically to voters who actually knew the ballot 
measures’ substance.81
 
 77. A similar cognitive process may actually underlie party identification 
itself. See, e.g., Arthur Miller, Christopher Wlezien & Anne Hildreth, A Refer-
ence Group Theory of Partisan Coalitions, 53 J. POL. 1134, 1147 (1991).  
 Voters who knew neither the interest 
group positions nor the ballot measures’ substance, however, 
voted very differently from the other two groups of voters in 
 78. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 n.23 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 79. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Vot-
ing Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
63 (1994).  
 80. Id. at 67–68. 
 81. Id. at 72. 
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Lupia’s study, even controlling for other important influences.82
Cue-taking on the basis of campaign finance information is 
not a purely academic point. One recent survey found that just 
less than half of all voters report that they are aware of specific 
organizations or individuals, as well as specific funders of cam-
paigns, that support or oppose a ballot measure in their state.
 
In other words, knowledge of the interest group position on the 
ballot measures appeared to be a substitute for actual substan-
tive knowledge about the policy details of the ballot measures. 
83 
Although a smaller percentage of voters reports that they ac-
tively sought out information about contributors on ballot 
measure campaigning, voters receive at least some information 
about contributors from news reporting on ballot measures, 
campaign advertisements calling out sources of support and 
endorsements for both sides, and source disclosures on each 
advertisement itself identifying its funding. The same survey 
found that a large majority of voters support compelled cam-
paign finance disclosure in direct democracy and believes that 
it would change their opinion about a ballot measure if they 
know which well-known organizations contributed money to 
campaigning.84 Along these lines, a federal district court and 
then the Ninth Circuit credited trial evidence showing that Cal-
ifornia voters were significantly influenced by knowledge about 
sources of campaign finance contributions in direct democracy 
and thought it was important to have public access to that in-
formation.85
Campaign finance disclosure not only offers a snapshot of 
overall support and opposition on a ballot measure, but com-
mon requirements of source disclosure efficiently provide voters 
with information about speaker credibility. Source disclosure 
laws in most states require the identity of the financial sponsor 





 82. Id. 
 Of course, this disclosure informs voters 
about the identity of at least one group or individual invested 
enough in the ballot measure to pay for a campaign advertise-
 83. Dick M. Carpenter II, Mandatory Disclosure for Ballot-Initiative 
Campaigns, 13 INDEP. REV. 567, 573 (2009). 
 84. Id. at 572.  
 85. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1106 n.25 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 86. See generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 
IND. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (2010) (arguing in favor of source disclosure and sur-
veying state law).  
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ment. More importantly, the disclosure occurs at the point of 
receipt, mediating absorption of the advertisement’s message, 
so that voters can incorporate a judgment about the sponsor’s 
credibility when it assesses the message. Research from psy-
chology and political science finds that people are skilled at 
crediting and discrediting the truth of a communication when 
they have knowledge about the source,87 but particularly when 
they have knowledge about the source at the time of the com-
munication as opposed to subsequent acquisition.88
Of course, disclosure is hardly a panacea for voter compe-
tence. Voters are notoriously uninformed about politics, and 
disclosure can improve voter competence only so much. Many 
commentators question whether heuristic reasoning based on 
simple cues should be understood as a normatively desirable 
basis for election decisions, in place of a more robust ideal of in-
formed engagement.
 Source dis-
closure equips voters with credibility information alongside the 
communication itself without requiring separate effort by vot-
ers to look up campaign finance information. If the voters re-
ceive the communication, they also receive at the same time a 
bit of campaign finance disclosure that helps them evaluate its 
content. 
89 Other commentators contend that disclo-
sure does not disseminate sufficiently through the public to 
make an important difference to voter competence,90 while oth-
er work suggests that voting cues ought to be provided on the 
ballot itself to increase their salience in voter decision-
making.91
 
 87. See, e.g., Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When Do Cues Eliminate 
Differences Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 
964, 974–75 (2009). 
 What is more, certain types of mandated disclosure—
disclosure of ballot measure petition signatories, for instance—
 88. See, e.g., Pamela M. Homer & Lynn R. Kahle, Source Expertise, Time 
of Source Identification, and Involvement in Persuasion: An Elaborative Pro-
cessing Perspective, 19 J. ADVERTISING 30, 37 (1990); Brian Sternthal et al., 
The Persuasive Effect of Source Credibility: A Situational Analysis, 42 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 285, 288–89 (1978); Brian Sternthal et al., The Persuasive Effect of 
Source Credibility: Tests of Cognitive Response, 4 J. CONSUMER RES. 252, 259 
(1978); Charles D. Ward & Elliott McGinnies, Persuasive Effects of Early and 
Late Mention of Credible and Noncredible Sources, 86 J. PSYCHOL. 17, 17 
(1974). 
 89. See, e.g., James H. Kuklinski & Norman L. Hurley, On Hearing and 
Interpreting Political Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking, 56 J. 
POL. 729, 732 (1994).  
 90. Carpenter II, supra note 83, at 569.  
 91. See Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett, & Mathew D. McCubbins, 
The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 317 (2010). 
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offer much less useful information to voters than disclosure of 
high-level campaign finance sponsors. But disclosure of some 
sort is an imperfect but useful tool that legislatures have de-
ployed to help fill the large informational gap that voters face 
in direct democracy. As the Internet eases the costs of acquir-
ing campaign finance information for average voters, it makes 
it even more likely that average voters have access to useful in-
formation and in some cases directly tap into the databases 
available at the fingertips of many voters.92
IV.  LEGISLATURES, NOT COURTS   
  
Despite expressions of new worry about campaign disclo-
sure, the Internet age does not require a fundamental revision 
of the constitutional orientation toward campaign disclosure in 
direct democracy. The case law already accommodates the 
threat of harassment in light of the minimal demonstrated risk 
from campaign disclosure. Although commentators have argued 
that the current law does not strike the right balance between 
privacy and disclosure on other grounds, these considerations 
are best left to legislative adjustment rather than judicial 
constitutionalization. They raise policy questions that the polit-
ical process, left to itself, is fully able to accommodate even bet-
ter than courts, and indeed, judicial interference would limit 
legislative experimentation by constitutionalizing the law even 
further.  
What the litigation over campaign disclosure in direct de-
mocracy demonstrates more than anything else is the lack of 
evident risk of serious harassment even in the Internet age. As 
Rick Hasen summarizes, “there is virtually no record of har-
assment of donors outside the context of the most hot-button 
social issue, gay marriage, and even there, much of the evi-
dence is weak.”93 In Doe v. Reed, an amicus brief from direct 
democracy scholars noted that not a single petition signer al-
leged any harassment or intimidation among the more than a 
million citizens who signed petitions to qualify any of the twen-
ty-eight statewide referenda nationwide between 2000 and 
2009 before the case.94
 
 92. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (arguing 
that “modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative”).  
 On remand, the district court likewise 
 93. Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out, A Qualified Defense of Disclosure Laws, 
27 J.L. & POL. 557, 559 (2012). 
 94. Brief for Direct Democracy Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 12, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559).  
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found with respect to the specifics of the case that the plaintiffs 
“supplied evidence that hurts rather than helps its case” and 
concluded that the “set of experiences of threats, harassment, 
or reprisals suffered or reasonably likely to be suffered by R-71 
signers cannot be characterized as ‘serious and widespread.’”95
Recently, however, some commentators have argued that 
the existing law on disclosure does not take into proper account 
the broader privacy interests implicated by disclosure beyond 
the risk of harassment. For instance, William McGeveran ar-
gues that “the orthodox view of privacy harms in election law 
construes those harms much too narrowly.”
 
As a consequence, in all but perhaps the rarest case, the bal-
ance of constitutional interests appears to swing decisively in 
favor of disclosure, or at least government discretion about dis-
closure requirements in direct democracy.  
96 He criticizes the 
district court for relying on the fact of Proposition 8’s passage 
as evidence of its popularity and its supporters’ 
nonmarginality. McGeveran argues against limiting constitu-
tional recognition of privacy concerns about campaign disclo-
sure to marginal political groups and more broadly that “indi-
viduals whose opinions differ from those around them will put 
their heads down and disengage from political activity if that is 
the only way to avoid disclosure.”97
Prominent commentators including Richard Briffault, Rick 
Hasen, and Bruce Cain have similarly argued that there is lit-
tle or no voter information to be gained from disclosure from 
average, low-level contributors, for example, at least relative to 




 95. Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1212 (W.D. Wash. 2011).  
 They may 
be right on policy grounds that disclosure laws should be recal-
ibrated toward privacy and less disclosure. Particularly for the 
typical low-level contributor, the compelled disclosure of name, 
address, and occupation adds little to the electorate’s under-
standing of the relevant ballot measure except perhaps in the 
aggregate across many other low-level contributors. The aggre-
gate pattern of many contributors of a certain profile, say from 
a particular industry or region, may be useful for voters to 
 96. McGeveran, supra note 29, at 865.  
 97. Id. at 878.  
 98. See Briffault, supra note 4, at 276; see also Bruce Cain, Shade from the 
Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND, Nov. 8, 2010, available 
at http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-from-the-glare 
-the-case-for-semi-disclosure/. See generally Hasen, supra note 93. 
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learn,99
However, this type of policy calibration can and should oc-
cur by legislative adjustment, not judicial dictate through con-
stitutional litigation.
 but the contributor-specific information at the individ-
ual level is valueless from the standpoint of voter education 
when the contributor is not well known and the contribution is 
not large.  
100 McGeveran argues against what he sees 
as “the overwhelming presumption in favor of disclosure now 
applied,”101 but this position tends to overstate the judicial posi-
tion on disclosure. True, courts generally uphold campaign dis-
closure laws, but they do so only in deference to legislatures 
that enact them as part of a larger political process. In other 
words, disclosure is not a judicially mandated requirement, as 
McGeveran knows.102 Campaign disclosure requirements are 
legislated by the political process and of course subject to 
amendment and repeal by the same political process.103
 
 99. See Cain, supra note 
 Indeed, 
anti-disclosure arguments to constitutionalize the issues sweep 
so broadly that they potentially undercut what should be broad 
political support for trimming back disclosure requirements 
through thoughtful legislative adjustment. 
98. 
 100. See generally Eugene Volokh, Tort Law vs. Privacy (undated) (un-
published draft manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/ 
pdf/Intellectual_Life/LTW-Volokh.pdf (arguing similarly that courts should 
not impose certain new privacy rights and should instead defer to legislatures 
with respect to the appropriate balance between privacy interests and conflict-
ing duties under tort law). 
 101. McGeveran, supra note 29, at 880. 
 102. Id. at 865–66 (acknowledging legislatures and administrators could 
provide greater protection for privacy and elect not to do so). 
 103. Indeed, a number of states recognize worries about retaliation for po-
litical activity and have statutes protecting against such retaliation. See, e.g., 
Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory 
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295 (2012) 
(surveying state laws prohibiting employment retaliation for various forms of 
political activity). Many states specifically list certain disclosed political activi-
ty for protection against retaliation, such as petition signing. See, e.g., D.C. 
CODE § 1-1001.14(b)(3) (2012) (enacted 1978); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.637(6) 
(West 2012) (enacted 1939) (prohibiting employment retaliation for signing 
any ballot measure petition); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 731.40 (West 2011); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.495(2) (West 2012) (enacted 1993) (prohibit-
ing retaliation for “in any way supporting or opposing a . . . ballot proposi-
tion”). The same is true for campaign finance activity. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 18:1461.1(A)(2), 1483, 1505.2 (2011) (enacted 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 2012) (enacted 1994); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 260.665(1)-(2) (West 2012) (enacted 1971). But see Fowler v. Neb. Accounta-
bility & Disclosure Comm’n, 330 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1983) (declaring unconsti-
tutional a state law of a similar type). 
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First, to the extent that the technology alters the appropri-
ate balance between disclosure and privacy, legislatures have 
the regular capacity to monitor changing conditions as they de-
velop and update the law, at least to the degree that courts 
leave them the discretion to do so.104 How best to balance the 
general chilling effect of disclosure against the public interest, 
absent greater evidence of a larger threat of harassment, is 
precisely the type of policy question where legislatures have 
comparative institutional advantages over courts. Legislatures 
can marshal available empirical evidence about harassment 
and the general chilling effect of disclosure law more effective-
ly, at least in theory, than courts. Indeed, when it comes to 
campaign finance disclosure laws, the Court has declined to ex-
ercise such fine-grained oversight about legislative distinctions 
in degree that cannot be said to amount to difference in kind.105
Second, new concerns about privacy and harassment al-
leged in the most recent cases are generalizable worries appli-
cable across citizens and amenable to redress through the polit-
ical process. Proposition 8 supporters, for instance, may be 
correct that their legislature has set the threshold too low for 
disclosure and introduced an unnecessary opportunity for social 
friction that is not offset by the resulting gains in voter compe-
tence and other government interests. However, this low-grade 
chilling and mild harassment is a generalized harm that might 
be suffered by any particular person or group on a particular 
ballot measure in the issue-by-issue politics of direct democra-
cy. On a different ballot measure, it may be a very different 
category of person or group that is at greatest risk of low-grade 
chilling and harassment. In other words, the injury claimed in 
these cases is less about the chronic concerns of worried, stig-
matized minorities than single-shot complaints from one side in 
the episodic, evenly matched, but heated single-issue politics of 
direct democracy. Over the run of ballot measures, however, no 
individual voter is likely to belong to the unpopular minority 
consistently across many varied issues.  
  
 
 104. This appears to be what Congress has done with respect to privacy 
concerns surrounding other forms of personal data. See McGeveran, supra 
note 28, at 2–3; see also Jacob Gardener, Sunlight Without Sunburns: Balanc-
ing Public Access and Privacy in Ballot Measure Disclosure Laws, 18 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 262 (2012) (proposing a four-level disclosure policy with differ-
ent measures of public disclosure dependent on the type of donor, ballot meas-
ure, and corruption concerns).  
 105. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976).  
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The low-grade chilling effect from campaign disclosure 
laws therefore is entirely different from the type of harassment 
requiring constitutional exemption from disclosure under the 
case law.106
To the degree that the legislature wrongly sets the balance 
between low-grade chilling and harassment and other govern-
ment interests, the legislature is the lawmaking institution 
best-positioned to receive complaints and best-incentivized to 
correct the problem. McGeveran claims persuasively that cam-
paign disclosure entails certain privacy costs that may chill 
participation to a degree. People may be less willing to partici-
pate if they have less control over the way that they are per-
ceived by others and must consider that congregants, patients, 
or parents may learn of their political activity.
 Those were exceptional cases where the harassment 
flowed from the unpopularity of stigmatized minorities subject 
to retaliation for their views by the majority. The potential 
harm involved was not only far more severe and obvious than 
what was claimed by the Proposition 8 supporters, but also not 
amenable to accommodation from the political process. For 
stigmatized and unpopular minorities, the same majority ani-
mus underlying their harassment makes redress through a ma-
joritarian political process unlikely as well. The same was not 
true for Proposition 8 supporters, and thus the relevance of 
Proposition 8’s passage to the district court’s decision. To the 
degree that Proposition 8 supporters suffered a demonstrable, 
troubling harm from disclosure, they also comprised a majority 
of the electorate presumptively with the political clout to de-
fend themselves through the political process, and even repeal 
the disclosure requirements.  
107 Of course, dis-
closure nonetheless entails a risk of displeasing fellow citizens, 
but the legislature should be trusted to decide what reasonable 
measure should be required of what Justice Scalia describes as 
“civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.”108
Third, it is unclear how well courts could incorporate 
broader concerns about chilling on an as-applied basis to better 
 These 
are concerns, borne by all citizens and voters, that legislatures 
can assess and should dial into their standard calibration of 
electoral regulation, including campaign disclosure laws. 
 
 106. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 28, at 14–15 (distinguishing privacy 
costs from the risk of outright harassment recognized by the Court).  
 107. See id. at 16–20 (discussing the dignitary and privacy costs of disclo-
sure short of harassment). 
 108. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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calibrate disclosure laws to those concerns. As-applied chal-
lenges, to preempt harassment as alleged, must seek exemp-
tions from public disclosure ex ante, before a pattern of har-
assment specifically from disclosure can be established. As-
applied exemptions must be based on a predictive judgment 
about the likelihood and severity of harassment to occur. Such 
predictive judgments were easier in cases like NAACP v. Ala-
bama and Brown, where the inference of continued harassment 
would follow from the long, indisputable history of private and 
government harassment against the locally disfavored, politi-
cally stigmatized groups in those cases.109
However, similar predictive judgments about the likelihood 
of severe harassment for a particular ballot measure, outside of 
a longer narrative of sociopolitical harassment, is much more 
difficult. In a case like ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, courts 
would need to predict ex ante, for that particular ballot meas-
ure, the likelihood of harassment or chilling participation from 
disclosure of contributions above a particular dollar level. Then, 
courts would need to balance that chill against the government 
interest in voter competence from disclosure above some higher 
threshold. For a particular ballot measure, at what dollar 
amount, but not below it, would the government be justified in 
requiring individual disclosure because the generalized chill is 
outweighed by an interest in voter competence? On what evi-
dence would that case-by-case judicial judgment be based? 
There is little case-specific information about harassment on 
which an as-applied judgment could be based, because of a low-
er-grade risk of harassment or chill, in the absence of any clear 
historical record of such. These doubts multiply when the claim 
is made by members of a popular electoral majority, such as 
 The Court relied up-
on the historical record of harassment suffered by stigmatized 
groups that would predictably recur in the absence of judicial 
protection. For this category of exceptional case, the expected 
harm is not only far greater than the chill on speech specifically 
from disclosure, the probability of the harm was far more cer-
tain on the basis of established history.  
 
 109. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 99–
102 (1982) (describing the long history of government harassment of the So-
cialist Workers Party, including surveillance, counterintelligence, and investi-
gation of its membership and sources of support); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 
U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (citing the uncontroverted showing of past economic 
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and public hostility 
as a consequence of membership disclosure). 
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supporters of Proposition 8 in Hollingsworth, who obviously can 
claim no meaningful history of ongoing political discrimination.  
Arguments in favor of hemming in campaign disclosure re-
quirements through as-applied challenges therefore may ulti-
mately reveal themselves in practice to be nearly categorical 
claims against disclosure that apply uniformly across the wide 
swath of cases. These arguments do not depend so much on 
particularized showings of evidence, but instead flow from 
broader worries about the costs of compelled disclosure per 
se.110 To the degree that exemptions on an as-applied basis 
should be granted “generous[ly],” as Justice Alito proposes in 
Doe v. Reed on the basis of the evidence of harassment there,111 
as-applied exemptions would be likely to be based less on a 
properly individualized judgment of each case’s special circum-
stances than on a general belief that disclosure requirements 
require too much risk of low-grade harassment except when the 
ballot measure is too mundane to be controversial. This intru-
sive judicial oversight of campaign disclosure would threaten to 
flip the presumption of constitutionality and quickly collapse 
into the type of policy fine tuning that courts typically have 
shunned in campaign finance law.112
Of course, the Court recognized a broader right to privacy 
for certain election-related disclosures. In McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission, the Court struck down an Ohio statute 
that compelled disclosure of authorship on campaign litera-
ture.
 The precise calibration of 
the specific thresholds and requirements for campaign disclo-
sure is a difficult legislative question, not a judicial one that 
can be thoughtfully or efficiently administered through liberal-
ly granted as-applied exemptions.  
113 The statute was challenged by Margaret McIntyre, who 
opposed a local school tax levy, printed anonymous leaflets ad-
vocating against it, and distributed them on car windshields in 
the school parking lot. The Court, in holding unconstitutional 
the disclosure requirement, explained that “an author’s deci-
sion to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of 
speech protected by the First Amendment.”114
 
 110. See, e.g., Lourie, supra note 
 Relying heavily 
32, at 152–53 (observing that the claimed 
harm from disclosure in Citizens United would apply broadly to virtually any 
donor to a candidate or issue that did not have nearly uniform support). 
 111. Id. at 2824 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 112. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (warning that Congress’s 
“failure to engage in such fine tuning does not invalidate the legislation”).  
 113. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).  
 114. Id. at 342.  
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on McIntyre, the Court later struck down a Colorado disclosure 
law in the context of direct democracy in Buckley v. American 
Constitutional Law Foundation (ACLF).115 The case addressed 
a requirement that petitioners collecting signatures to qualify 
initiatives for the ballot must wear name badges while solicit-
ing signatures. The Court concluded that the badge require-
ment “discourages participation . . . by forcing name identifica-
tion without sufficient cause.”116
However, these decisions recognizing a broader privacy 
right against campaign disclosure are best seen as categorically 
tailored to the cases’ specific circumstances.
 
117 Unlike general 
campaign finance disclosure requirements, for instance, the 
challenged laws in McIntyre and ACLF were particularly un-
likely to produce information useful to voters.118 The late Mrs. 
McIntyre was not a public figure and epitomized the local activ-
ist whose authorship of her leaflets was unlikely to be meaning-
ful to many people. Likewise, the names of the various anony-
mous circulators in ACLF were similarly unlikely to help voters 
assess the merits of the ballot measures for which they peti-
tioned. As the Court explained in McIntyre, “[I]n the case of a 
handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the 
recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if any-
thing, to the reader’s ability to evaluate the document’s mes-
sage.”119 A required disclosure on hand-distributed campaign 
literature, or a circulator’s name badge, were exceedingly un-
likely to advance voter competence. The non-usefulness of this 
information was specifically contrasted by the Court against 
the value of more comprehensive campaign finance disclosures 
usually required by law.120
 
 115. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
  
 116. Id. at 200.  
 117. See generally Kang, supra note 28, at 1089–95 (contrasting judicial 
solicitude toward face-to-face advocacy and pamphleteering on one hand and 
retail, broadcast campaign-finance politics on the other hand).  
 118. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 482 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (noting that “in these cases the state’s interest in disseminating 
such information to voters is at a low ebb” (citation omitted)).  
 119. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49.  
 120. See ACLF, 525 U.S. at 202–03 (“Disclosure of the names of initiative 
sponsors, and of the amounts they have spent gathering support for their ini-
tiatives, responds to that substantial state interest.”); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 
354–56 (noting that the disclosure interest in voter competence articulated in 
campaign finance cases did not apply to the kind of independent activity pur-
sued by Mrs. McIntyre); see also Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for 
Disclosure, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 413, 456–57 (2012) (developing this contrast 
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Even more important, the challenged laws in these deci-
sions required disclosure in a face-to-face context where the 
worry about harassment was understood by the Court to be 
categorically more severe. In McIntyre, the Court distinguished 
the risk of harassment from local pamphleteering and cam-
paign finance disclosure by noting that “even though money 
may ‘talk,’ its speech is less specific, less personal, and less 
provocative than a handbill—and as a result, when money sup-
ports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate re-
taliation.”121
The limited nature of pamphleteering typically confines its 
usefulness mainly to the local level where a worry about per-
sonal harassment among friends and neighbors is greatest. In 
ACLF, the Court took pains to explain that the required disclo-
sure of identity while circulators approach potential signatories 
“operates when reaction to the circulator’s message is immedi-
ate and may be the most intense, emotional, and unreasoned” 
and “expose[s] the circulator to the risk of ‘heat of the moment’ 
harassment.”
 
122 In comparing McIntyre and ACLF, the Court 
looked to the degree of “one-on-one communication” as the 
measure for the risk of harassment, concluding that there was 
an even greater risk of harassment in ACLF because “[p]etition 
circulation is the less fleeting encounter.”123
By comparison, the harassment worry with respect to gen-
eral reporting and government disclosure is several steps re-
moved from the risk of face-to-face harassment. If nothing else, 
face-to-face contact simply provides the immediate opportunity 
for harassment that is absent in general reporting and disclo-
sure obligations at issue in recent cases like Hollingsworth v. 
Perry and Doe v. Reed. Unlike local pamphleteering and signa-
ture gathering, general collection of mass information by the 
government lends itself to any sort of harassment only if an in-
terested party takes several steps to investigate disclosed in-
formation and then track down the targets. One must go 
through the effort of poring through government reporting, pick 
out some limited set of targets, and then organize a plan for 
harassment. True, the Internet reduces the costs of the effort, 
but the series of steps involved, with the likelihood that only 
  
 
in the context of an antifactionalist rationale for campaign disclosure). 
 121. 514 U.S. at 355.  
 122. 525 U.S. at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 123. Id.; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of 
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (articulating the same reasoning). 
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the most prominent or most active citizens will be chosen for 
harassment if at all, severely reduces the risk of harassment of 
low-level figures such as Mrs. McIntyre on the basis of com-
pelled disclosure. Absent more convincing evidence of harass-
ment that can be traced back to disclosure of this nature, the 
harassment worry in McIntyre and ACLF should be understood 
as an order of magnitude different.  
This is not to say that the privacy worries of plaintiffs in 
cases like Hollingsworth and Doe v. Reed are without merit, at 
least over the longer run if not today. There is no doubt that 
the risk of harassment increases as the costs of information ac-
quisition from disclosure decrease, such that the type of allega-
tions in those cases may become more common and substanti-
ated over time. However, it is better for legislatures rather 
than courts to monitor those risks and calibrate an appropriate 
policy adjustment that balances the increased risk of harass-
ment against whatever interests in voter competence weigh on 
the other side. Courts can protect against those risks only on a 
cumbersome as-applied basis, or by overgeneralizing credible 
risks recognized in NAACP v. Alabama and ACLF to a large 
run of circumstances where the same dynamics are materially 
different but difficult to distinguish by ex ante judicial ruling.  
  CONCLUSION   
Disclosure has always been the most widely supported 
form of campaign regulation across partisanship and political 
persuasion. In Citizens United, the most consequential cam-
paign finance case in thirty years, eight of nine justices voted to 
uphold the comprehensive disclosure provisions of the Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act, even as the Court dismantled other 
longstanding campaign finance regulations and re-made the fu-
ture of campaign finance law. However, disclosure may not be 
on as secure constitutional ground as this history of support 
suggests. De-regulation activists who have re-made campaign 
finance law in stunningly rapid fashion now are training their 
sights on campaign disclosure laws as their new target for con-
stitutional challenge.124
 
 124. See James Bennet, The New Price of American Politics, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Oct. 2012, at 66, 68 (summarizing Jim Bopp’s litigation success 
against campaign finance regulation and quoting Bopp as regarding the com-
plete de-regulation of campaign finance as “in the endgame”).  
 Although I argue here that legislatures 
deserve judicial deference on campaign disclosure, campaign 
finance reformers and sympathetic legislatures would also be 
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best advised to monitor the politics of direct democracy rather 
closely and adapt disclosure laws pre-emptively to the degree 
appropriate, sooner rather than later as a hedge against more 
aggressive judicial intervention that seems likely to come.  
